University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Departmental Technical Reports (CS)

Computer Science

8-2020

Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making Bodies: EconomicsRelated Analysis
Nguyen Ngoc Thach
Banking University Ho Chi Minh City, ajeb@buh.edu.vn

Olga Kosheleva
The University of Texas at El Paso, olgak@utep.edu

Vladik Kreinovich
The University of Texas at El Paso, vladik@utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Economics Commons

Comments:
Technical Report: UTEP-CS-20-87
Recommended Citation
Thach, Nguyen Ngoc; Kosheleva, Olga; and Kreinovich, Vladik, "Need for Diversity in Elected DecisionMaking Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis" (2020). Departmental Technical Reports (CS). 1500.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep/1500

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Departmental Technical Reports (CS) by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making
Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis
Nguyen Ngoc Thach, Olga Kosheleva, and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract On a qualitative level, everyone understands the need to have diversity
in elected decision-making bodies, so that the viewpoint of each group be properly
taken into account. However, when only the usual economic criteria are used in this
election – e.g., in the election of company’s board – the resulting bodies often underrepresent some groups (e.g., women). A frequent way to remedy this situation is to
artificially enforce diversity instead of strictly following purely economic criteria.
In this paper, we show the current seeming contradiction between economics and
diversity is caused by the imperfection of the use economic models: in an accurate
economics-related decision making model, optimization directly implies diversity.

1 Diversity and Economics-Related Decision Making:
Formulation of the Problem
Need for elected bodies. In a small community or a small company, decisions can
be made by all people getting together. This is how decisions are usually made in a
university’s department – by having a faculty meeting, so that each faculty member
has a chance to express his or her opinion, and these opinions are taken into account
when making a decision.
However, for a larger group – e.g., for all the university’s faculty – there are
already so many folks that it is not possible to give everyone a chance to talk. In
such situations, a usual idea is to elect a decision-making body.
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Cities elect city councils, countries elect parliaments, shareholders elect a company’s board, university faculty elect a faculty senate, etc.
Diversity in elected bodies is important. Populations are diverse, we have people of different ethnicity, different gender, different ages, etc. These people have
somewhat different agenda, somewhat different preferences. It is desirable that the
opinions of each group are taken into account when decisions are made. For this
purposes, it is desirable that all these groups are properly represented in the elected
body.
Even with the most democratic election procedures, however, some groups are
under-represented. For example, women are under-represented on the boards of
most companies and in most countries’ parliaments.
How can improve this situation?
Usual approach: enforce diversity by limiting democracy. The fact that some
groups are under-represented in democratically elected decision-making bodies is
usually interpreted as the need to enforce diversity by limiting democracy. For example, some countries and some companies have a quota on female representation
– and on representation on other under-represented groups.
The problem with the usual approach. In many cases, elections are based on
economics-related criteria. For example, when shareholders elect board members,
their main objective is to maintain the economic prosperity of the company. So,
naturally, they elect candidates who have shown to be successful in economic leadership.
For cities and countries, this is also largely true: usually, leaders who lead to
economic prosperity are re-elected, while leaders under whom economy tanked are
not re-elected.
From this viewpoint, it seems clear what we want from an elected body: there
are economic criteria that we want to impose. The need to enforce diversity disrupts
this straightforward idea. It is no longer clear what should we optimize, how should
we combine traditional economic criteria with this new diversity requirements.
But is diversity indeed inconsistent with economics? Many folks argue – in our
opinion, convincingly – that diversity actually helps economy. Their arguments
are very straightforward: economics is complicated and very competitive. To make
economy successful, we need to use all the talent we have. If in some country, citizens, e.g., consistently ignore females and only elect male board members and make
CEOs, they are not using half of the country’s talent – and, as a result, this country
will eventually lose competition with countries that utilize all their talent.
From this viewpoint, diversity is not only consistent with economics – it should
follow from the economic considerations.
How can we translate this informal argument into a precise model? Informally,
the above argument makes sense, but the existing economic considerations still lead
to under-representation of different groups. How can we translate the above informal
argument into a precise model?
This is what we attempt to do in this paper.
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2 Accurate Economics-Related Decision Making Model and How
Its Optimization Implies Diversity
Individual decision making according to decision theory. The traditional decision
theory describes how a rational person should make decisions. Reasonable rationality criteria lead to the conclusions:
• that preferences of a rational decision maker can be described by a special function u(x) called utility function, and
• that out of several alternatives a, the rational decision maker should select the
one with the largest value of expected utility
def

u(a) = Ea [u(x)] =

∑ p j (a) · u(x j ),

(1)

where x j are possible consequences of making the decision a and p j (a) is the
probability of the consequence x j ;
see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8].
Utility is defined modulo a linear transformation. Utilities are determined modulo a linear transformation u → a · u + b. Usually, when we make a decision, there is
a status quo situation whose utility can be taken as 0. If we use this status quo situation as a starting point, then the only remaining transformations are transformations
of the type u → a · u.
Group decision making. What if a group of n people needs to make a decision? For
each participant i, and for each alternative a, we can determine the expected utility
ui (a) of this participant corresponding to the alternative a. So, each alternative is
characterized by a tuple U(a) = (u1 (a), . . . , un (a)) . Based on these tuples, we need
to decide which alternative is better for the group.
Since utility of each participant i is defined modulo a linear transformation ui →
ai · ui , it is reasonable to require that the comparison between two tuples U(a) and
U(b) not change if we apply such transformations. It turns out that this natural
requirement uniquely determines group decision making – namely, we should select
an alternative for which the product
n

∏ ui (a)

(2)

i=1

of expected utilities is the largest; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
This criterion was first formulated by the Nobelist John Nash in [4]. It is therefore
known as Nash’s bargaining solution.
Analysis of the situation. Before we go into a more serious analysis, let us first
mention that there is a computational problem related to the direct use of the formula
(2). Indeed, the population size n is usually large – since, as we have mentioned, the
very need for a elected body only appears when n is large. In the computer, a product
of the large number of values very fast leads either to a number which is too small
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to be represented in a computer, or to a number which is too large. For example, in
a city of 1 million people, if ui = 2, we get the value 21000000 which is too large, and
if ui = 1/2, we get the value 2−1000000 which is too small.
The usual way to avoid this computational problem is to use logarithms, since the
logarithm of a product is equal to the sum of the logarithms. From this viewpoint,
maximizing the expression (2) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm
n

∑ ln (ui (a)) .

(3)

i=1

Adding millions of numbers may also lead to computational problems, so an even
better idea is to divide the expression (3) by n and thus, to maximize the average
instead of the sum:
1 n
· ∑ ln (ui (a)) .
(4)
n i=1
In these terms, each person i is characterized by a unique tuple Li formed by the
values
def
Li (a) = ln (ui (a))
(5)
corresponding to different alternatives a.
Since the population size n is large, we can say that we have a probability distribution ρ(L) on the set of all such tuples L – just like we can say that there is a
probability distribution of people by age, by height, or by weight. In terms of the
probability distribution, the average value (5) can be described as the expected value
Z

`(a) =

ρ(L) · L(a) dL.

(6)

What happens if we select a decision-making body. The formula (6) describes
the ideal decision making, when the opinion of each person is explicitly taken into
account. As we have mentioned, for large n, this is not realistically possible.
Instead, we elect a decision-making body, and this body makes decisions. In the
ideal world, decisions of this body also follow Nash’s bargaining solution – i.e.,
equivalently, this body selects an alternative that maximizes the expected value
Z

`B (a) =

ρB (L) · L(a) dL,

(7)

where the probability measure ρB (L) describes the distribution of tuples L among
the members of the elected body.
What we want. We want to make sure that the decisions of the elected body reflect
the opinions of the people. In other words, we want to make sure that the decisions
based on the value (7) coincide (or at least are close) to decisions based on the
value (6).
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Thus, for every alternative a, the values (6) and (7) of the corresponding criteria
must coincide – or at least be close to each other.
This leads to diversity. The only way to guarantee that the values (6) and (7) always
coincide (or are close) is to make sure that the corresponding probability measures
ρ(L) and ρB (L) coincide (or are close).
In other words, for each group of people characterized by special values of the
tuple L, the proportion of this group’s representatives in the elected board (as described by the probability measure ρB (L)) should be close to the proportion of this
group in the population as a whole (as described by the probability measure ρ(L)).
This is exactly what perfect diversity looks like. So indeed, for an accurate
economics-related description of decision making, optimization leads to diversity.
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